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Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality:  
The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein 








Two issues have been at center stage in recent social philosophy, both in the ana-
lytic and the continental tradition: on the one hand, the nature of interpersonal 
understanding, or empathy; on the other hand, the possibility and nature of col-
lective intentionality, shared emotions, and group agency. Indeed, there are not 
many who have investigated more thoroughly both these issues, and, even if not 
quite explicitly, their complex interrelation, than the philosopher Edith Stein 
(1891–1942). This special issue explores Edith Stein’s social philosophy, especially 
as expounded in her phenomenological writings from the 1910s and 1920s. In 
particular, it will investigate the systematic links between Stein’s pioneering work 
on empathy (Stein 1917), and her less known but certainly not less original theory 
of collective intentionality and community (Stein 1922).  
One of the main aims of this special issue is to re-describe, re-contextualize, 
and critically assess Stein’s intriguing phenomenology of social reality in contem-
porary terms, and, specifically, in relation to the relevant current trends in the phi-
losophy of (collective) emotions, social ontology, social cognition research, social 
psychology, and political philosophy. 
 If we look at the contemporary philosophical landscape, the issue of empa-
thy and collectivity are typically dealt with separately from one another. Moreo-
ver, in stark contrast to Stein—and many other early phenomenologists such as 
Husserl, Gurwitsch, Scheler, or Walther, who all worked in such diverse areas 
within social philosophy as social cognition, social ontology or social epistemolo-
gy, and with a few notable contemporary exceptions (Butterfill 2013; Tomasello 
2014; Zahavi 2015a, 2015b; Bianchin forthcoming; León forthcoming)—authors 
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writing on these topics usually do not cross their narrow disciplinary boundaries; 
it would typically be even different authors working on these issues, with relative-
ly little exchange. Thus, on the one hand, there is an ongoing and lively debate on 
the epistemological and ontological problem of other minds, the development, 
nature and structure of our perceptual, cognitive, and emotional access to others, 
empathy’s relation to morality, and, quite generally, the nature and structure of 
interpersonal understanding (e.g., Coplan and Goldie 2011; Stueber 2013; Mai-
bom 2014). In the past few decades, work on empathy and mindreading has been 
considerably fueled by developmental (Eisenberg and Straver 1987; Hoffman 
2000; Baron and Cohen 2013), social psychological (Cialdini et al. 1997), and neu-
roscientific work (Decety and Ickes 2009; Singer and Lamm 2009), especially on 
the infamous neural correlates of cognitive models of imitation, so-called ‘mirror-
neurons’ (Gallese and Goldman 1998; Iacoboni 2009), as well as by theoretical 
arguments deriving from the so-called ‘theory of mind’ debate (Davies and Stone 
1995a, 1995b; Nichols and Stich 2003; Malle 2004; Hutto and Ratcliffe 2007; 
Ratcliffe 2007).  
Within the continental tradition, and especially within phenomenology, since 
Husserl has re-introduced the notion, the manner in which one person under-
stands another, or engages with others has been usually treated under the general 
heading of ‘empathy,’ or Einfühlung (a term that originated in nineteenth-century 
German philosophical aesthetics and psychology; see Stueber 2006: 5-19; Coplan 
and Goldie 2011). In recent years, there has been a welcome exchange between 
ToM and phenomenological treatments of the notion, and some even speak of a 
‘rediscovering empathy’ in the context of the contemporary ToM debate (Stueber 
2006). 
 On the other hand, one can witness not only a turn to the second person—a 
turn that has also been labeled the “You turn” (Eilan 2014) in psychology and 
philosophy—one could also speak of a ‘We turn’ in contemporary social philoso-
phy and in some rapidly expanding segments of philosophy of science, action, 
psychology and cognition, as well as the cognitive sciences (Gold 2005; Rupert 
2011; Chant et al. 2014; Huebner 2014; Tomasello 2014; Epstein 2015; Tollefsen 
2015).  
The possibility and nature of sharing of intentions, emotions and actions 
have been the object of increased attention within recent analytic philosophy, es-
pecially in a field that is now standardly referred to as ‘social ontology’—a label, 
incidentally, that was first used by Husserl in a manuscript from 1910 (Husserl 
1973: 102; see Salice 2013; Szanto forthcoming a). For example, philosophers of 
mind and action have investigated in great detail how it is possible for individuals 
to intend jointly to do something, and eventually to cooperate in doing what they 
so intend. Discussions in social ontology have typically concentrated on what ex-
actly makes collective intentionality collective. Also, much ink has been spilled on 
the question of whether collective intentions and agency are reducible to an ag-
gregation of individual agents or whether we need to postulate some supra-
individual bearer, a group mind, group or corporate person, or some group agent, 
of collective intentionality (see Rupert 2005, 2011; Huebner 2014; Szanto 2014). 
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More specifically, philosophers of action tend to dwell upon the question of 
where to ‘tie in,’ as it were, the ‘jointness’ in collective engagements: in the inten-
tional object or content of intentions, the ‘interlocking’ of interdependent inten-
tional plans and shared goals (Bratman 1992, 1993, 2014), the ‘we-mode’ (Searle 
1995, 2010; Tuomela 2007, 2013), or the ‘plural subject’ (Gilbert 1989, 2013) of 
collective intentions, or some other form of ‘rational integration’ individuals 
(Rovane 1998, 2014; Pettit 2003; List and Pettit 2011). On the basis of these dif-
ferent proposals, it has been aptly suggested to distinguish theories of collective 
intentionality in terms of mode, content, and subject accounts (Schweikard and 
Schmid 2013).1 
 Now, turning to the phenomenological movement, the issue of intersubjec-
tivity has indeed been discussed primarily within the ‘empathy’ paradigm, and 
within second-personal frameworks. But, in addition— and this is crucial—
phenomenologists of such different alignments as Husserl, Scheler, Gurwitsch, 
Walther, or Hildebrand have all dealt not only with the second-person but also 
with the first-person plural perspective, or the so-called ‘we-intentionality’ (see 
Mulligan 2001; Schmid 2007, 2009; Salice 2013; Caminada 2011; Chelstrom 2013; 
Szanto and Moran forthcoming; Szanto forthcoming a, forthcoming b; León and 
Zahavi forthcoming). 
 In the face of this very large amount of work dedicated to both empathy and 
we-intentionality and its affective, agential, or group personal variants, it is quite 
surprising that there has been hardly any attempt to relate systematically, let alone 
integrate, these diverse strands. This is all the more surprising if we consider that 
there are two trends in the contemporary discussion that would seem to lend 
support to the project of linking issues in empathy and social cognition to those 
in collective intentionality.  
 The first such trend of relating the second-person singular and the first-
person plural perspective, can be seen in the so-called ‘interactive turn’ in social 
cognition research (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher et al. 2008; Fuchs 
and De Jaegher 2009; Gallagher 2008a, 2008b; Gallagher and Varga 2013; 
Schilbach et al. 2013; Satne and Roepstorff 2015; see, critically, Herschbach 2012; 
Michael et al. 2014; Overgaard and Michael 2015), and the related, rapidly increas-
ing, but still rather narrow body of work exploring links between social cognition, 
joint attention and joint agency (Pacherie and Dokic 2006; Hobson and Hobson 
2007; Butterfill 2013; Gallotti and Frith 2013; Tomasello 2014; Zahavi 2014, 
2015a, 2015b; Abramova and Slors 2015; León 2015; see Szanto and Moran 2015; 
Bianchin forthcoming). For instance, it has been argued that collaborating agents 
are better mindreaders, since they can draw on a number of situational cues af-
forded by the very interaction, which might otherwise be unavailable (Butterfill 
                                                
1  Notice that these different approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Rather, the differ-
ent elements responsible for the collectivity of collective intentions (e.g., shared intentional con-
tents, goals, modes, or subjects) will, partly, build upon another. For instance, a plural subject 
account à la Gilbert will typically integrate elements from a Bratmanian shared goal account, 




2013); or that complex forms of we-intentionality and group agency conceptually 
require more basic face-to-face interaction and dyadic forms of empathy (Zahavi 
2015a, 2015b).  
 Secondly, in recent social psychology and the social neurosciences, a number 
of empirical studies have investigated how and to what extent group and, in par-
ticular, cultural and ethnic membership or one’s social identity affect, modulate or 
even bias not only intergroup, but also interpersonal understanding. These biases 
not only concern pro-social behaviour; a number of studies have demonstrated 
that social identity biases also concern emotional expression and its decoding and, 
generally, empathic understanding, and responses, which are significantly differ-
entiated along members/non-members or in-group/out-group divides (Bruneau 
et al. 2012; Eres and Molenberghs 2013). 
 Further, some have suggested that individuals may not only engage in recip-
rocal or mutual, but also properly interact or collectively perform acts of empa-
thy. And it has also been inquired whether individuals who share an emotions 
may be collectively, or as a group, targets of empathy (see Salice and Taipale 
forthcoming, and Szanto’s contribution in this issue). 
 What is remarkable is that Edith Stein prefigured both these ‘social turns’ in 
her early phenomenological work. But furthermore, above and beyond both her 
discussions of empathy and of collective intentionality, Stein developed an ac-
count of a third form of social relation above and beyond—or, better intermedi-
ate between—empathy and collective intentionality, namely socio-communicative, 
or social acts (soziale Akte, soziale Stellungnahmen), such as promises, orders, re-
quests (Stein 1922, 51 [58ff.], 175ff. [210ff.], 244 [292]; 1925, 41ff. [52ff.]). In her 
account, Stein followed Husserl, Scheler, and especially Reinach (1913), Stein’s 
mentor and friend in Göttingen. These social acts and, in particular, promises, 
are, since Hume (1741: esp. 196f.), considered to be the glue of sociality and the 
foundation of politics. And it is within this context, and with regard to the specif-
ic social act of (collective) recognition or acceptance (Anerkennung) of the state by 
its citizens, that Stein has also dealt with political issues and the largest-scale real-
life human sociality, the state (Stein 1925: esp. 37–50 [46-65]).2 
 To be sure, if we consider the political and socio-cultural context of Stein’s 
personal and intellectual development in the 1910s and 1920s, the mass-
                                                
2  However, consider that this type of social act (i.e., collective recognition), as some other 
examples of social acts Stein mentions (forgiving, allowing, etc.; 1922: 51) are not exactly ‘social 
acts’ in Reinach’s (1913) sense; see Schuhmann’s (1993) critical and very useful study of the 
relation between Stein and Reinach. Instead of there being simply a misunderstanding on Stein’s 
part (see Imhof 1987: 195), however, we rather contend that Stein is closer to Husserl’s, broader, 
use of the notions ‘social’ or ‘socio-communicative’ acts (kommunikative soziale Akte; Akte der 
sozialen Wechselbeziehung; e.g., Husserl 1950: 159; Husserl 1952: 194; Husserl 1953: 98ff.), which 
Husserl also labels “social I-Thou-acts and We-acts” (soziale Ich-Du-Akte und Wir-Akte; Hua 8: 
137), which, then, are closer to Reinach’s ‘other-directed acts’ (fremdpersonale Akte). Consider also 
related—but different—conceptions of recognition in contemporary phenomenological thought 
(Ricoeur 2005), and recent Neo-Hegelian or Frankfurt School social and political theory (e.g., 
Taylor 1992; Honneth 1992); see also James Jardine’s contribution in this special issue). For an 
insightful study of Husserl’s theory of the state, see Schumann 1988. 
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mobilization and political movements in and around Great War and in the Inter-
war period, her interest in social philosophy is not surprising. Moreover, her 
thinking is deeply shaped by her remarkable biography—which can be seen, 
somewhat paradoxically, both as a paradigm and an exception of an early 20th 
century intellectual in Central Europe—i.e., growing up as in an assimilated Jew-
ish family, being educated in Prussia, serving as a nurse in the First World War, 
being an early, avid, and not quite unimportant, women’s rights activist of her 
time,3 being refused a Habilitation, and ever struggling for academic recognition as 
both a Jew and a woman,4 converting to Catholicism (notably within an almost 
exclusively Protestant environment), and becoming a Carmelite nun, only to be 
killed in Auschwitz, and eventually becoming a ‘martyr’ and a Catholic saint.5  
It is also noteworthy that Stein, together with Gerda Walther—besides Die-
trich von Hildebrand (1930), Felix Kaufmann (1930, 1944), Tomoo Otaka (1932), 
Kurt Stavenhagen (1933), and Stein another most interesting phenomenological 
social ontologist (Walther 1923; see León and Zahavi forthcoming)—and Hedwig 
Conrad-Martius, Stein’s colleague and close friend from the Göttingen circle, rep-
resented, though not an official, a nonetheless influential circle of women philoso-
phers within the early phenomenological movement. Moreover, Stein’s pre-
conversion social and political thought must clearly be seen as embedded into the 
broader socio-cultural and historical context of her time: that is, in the broadest 
brush-strokes, the redrawing of the geographic and cultural borders of her place 
                                                
3  Stein was, for instance, commissioned to write a report for the Ministry of Education on 
the women’s education and educational reform, and even giving radio talks on the topic in the 
early 1930s (see Stein 2000; Baseheart 1989; Calcagno 2007: 20, and 63-79).  
4  A vivid illustration of the fact of being refused a Habilitation, and ever struggling for aca-
demic recognition as both Jew and woman is a hitherto unpublished letter that Husserl wrote, on 
May 29, 1919, sent from Freiburg to his colleague Georg Misch in Göttingen recommending 
Stein for a Habilitation there. The original document is archived in the Georg Misch Nachlass at 
the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen (shelf mark: Cod. Ms. G. 
Misch 74); a copy of the letter can be found in the Husserl Archive in Leuven. The editors wish 
to thank Dan Zahavi for drawing our attention to this document, Thomas Vongehr from the 
Husserl Archives Leuven for making the transcript available, and the SUB Göttingen for the kind 
permission to reproduce it here: 
 Sehr geehrter Herr Kollege! 
 Fräulein Dr. Stein, welche nach ihrem Doktorat fast 2 Jahre lang als meine wissen-
schaftliche Assistentin tätig war, wünscht sich Ihnen vorzustellen und in Betreff der Mög-
lichkeiten einer Habilitation in Göttingen Ihren Rat zu erbitten. Gestatten Sie mir nur so-
viel zu sagen, dass es sich dabei um eine wertvolle Persönlichkeit handelt, die ein gütiges 
Entgegenkommen verdient. Dass ich ihr nicht eine Meldung zur Habilitation in Freiburg 
anraten konnte hat, im Vertrauen gesagt, darin seinen Grund, dass in unserer phi-
los<ophischen> Fakultät (die der Göttinger philologisch-historischen Abtheilung ent-
spricht) bereits 3 Dozenten jüdischer Abstammung sind, und ich nicht erwarten kann, 
dass die Fakultät die Habilitation eines 4ten genehmigen würde. An sich hätte ich mir zur 
Unterstützung meiner Lehrtätigkeit eine so wertvolle phänomenologische Hilfskraft sehr 
gewünscht. Frl Stein hat sich auch als Leiterin eigener philosophischer Übungen sehr be-
währt. […]  
 Ihr sehr ergebener 
 EHusserl 
5  For a good recent study on Stein, religious martyrdom and the Shoah, see Silverman 2013. 
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of origin (of Breslau, on the margins of a former Empire, of Poland, Germany, 
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire), the eventual unification of Germany, the 
revolutions of the socio-political thought of the early Twentieth Century in West-
ern and Central Europe (Marxism and socialism, liberalism and anti-liberalism, 
etc.), or the emergence of phenomenology.6 As to the latter, she was immediately 
surrounded by a number of fellow phenomenologists in Göttingen working on 
similar issues, above all by Reinach and Husserl, who was intensively working on 
the phenomenology of intersubjectivity from around 1911 onwards. 
 With this rough contextualization in mind, consider now, in a little more de-
tail, the notions of empathy and collective intentionality. 
 Empathy, for Stein, is a sui generis form of intentional experience (see Stein 
1917: 20 [11]) directed upon the mental, or better, the experiential life of others. 
Put differently, empathy is a genuine other-directed experience. So much—or, 
rather, so little—seems to be clear.7 There are, essentially, six issues which are not 
only contested among Stein scholars but are also the central moot points within 
the contemporary debate in phenomenology, social cognition research (see Jacob 
and de Vignemont 2011; Michael 2014), the debate on morality and empathy 
(Debes 2011; Prinz 2011; Maibom 2014), and also on recognition in recent social 
and political philosophy (see Jardine in this issue, and Summa’s book review in 
this issue): (i) What type of mental act or experience is empathy (a form of intui-
tion, cognition, perception, simulation, imagination, inference or transposition, 
etc.), or is it none of these but rather, precisely, a sui generis intentional act with 
its own irreducible essential structure? And what is the precise structure of em-
pathic acts; do empathic processes have, for instance, any levels or layers (basic, 
re-enactive acts of empathy, etc.)? (ii) What is the relation of an empathizer’s ex-
perience to others’ experiences (a self-other overlap, affective identification, emo-
tional sharing, etc.)? (iii) What type of mental states or experiences can empathy 
target or access (emotions, thoughts, etc.)? (iv) What is empathy’s relation to self-
experience and self-knowledge (co-variance, constitutional correlation, etc.)? (v) 
How should we measure or assess empathic accuracy (Ickes 1997)? (vi) Finally, 
what role does empathy play for morality, moral judgment, or pro-social behav-
iour?  
 In the contributions to this special issue, the focus will mainly be on the first 
three of these issues, and only touch upon the other three wherever relevant. Re-
garding the first question, a number of contemporary phenomenologists have re-
cently defended the so-called ‘direct perception’ (DP) view of empathy (Gallagher 
2008a, 2008b, 2012; Zahavi 2010, 2011, 2014; Krueger 2012; Krueger and Over-
                                                
6  For some very useful accounts of this socio-cultural and intellectual environment, see 
Imhof 1987; MacIntyre 2006; Calcagno 2007 and 2014; Gubser 2014: 100-131, but also in the 
fascinating autobiography of Stein herself (Stein 2002), and the respective passages in the 
excellent intellectual biography of Scheler in Staude 1967; see also the critical contextualization of 
Stein’s theory of collective intentionality and community within this historical and political 
context in the contribution of Caminada. 
7  For two highly instructive papers on the lack of, and the need for, a precise definition or a 
broad-enough agreement on the notion of empathy, see Coplan 2011, and Michael 2014; see also 
Coplan and Goldie 2011, and Maibom 2014. 
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gaard 2011).8 According to DP, an empathizer is directly ‘reading off,’ as it were, 
another’s mental states from her communicative and bodily behaviour, such as 
posture, gestures, modulations in tonality of speech, (facial) expression, etc. For 
example, I can directly perceive or experience another’s shame, simply by seeing 
his blushing, and some additional situational cues, or environmental settings. For 
instance, I see that his skin color is not caused by his workout in the fitness-
center. Indeed, most phenomenologists from Scheler (1926) to Sartre (1943), and 
including Stein (e.g., 1917: 14f. [6f.], 93 [75]) (see Zahavi 2011; Dullstein 2012) 
more or less unambiguously endorse DP.9 In the contemporary landscape, DP is 
typically brought up against the so-called ‘theory theory of mind,’ according to 
which, roughly, one is inferring or interpreting another’s mental life by applying 
or projecting some folk-psychological theory.10 
 Furthermore, in the context of the theory of mind debate, in an influential 
book, Stueber (2006) has introduced a pair of concepts that proves useful to see 
contextualize Stein’s account and recognize her originality. Thus, Stueber distin-
guishes between so-called “basic” and “reenactive empathy”. Basic empathy, is a 
“knowledge-poor” mechanism that allows a subject to “recognize the other as 
being same-minded in a direct perceptual manner” (Stueber 2006: 147f.), for in-
stance, by reading off a basic emotions (e.g., anger), as opposed to more complex 
moral ones (forgiveness, guilt, etc.) from the facial expression of the target. Reen-
active empathy, on the other hand, applies to cognitively richer domains of ra-
tional thought and action, and targets the prediction and explication of another 
subject’s thinking and acting. Thus, a subject A empathically re-enacts a given 
mental process M of another subject B if A ‘runs through’ or enacts M and those 
relevant states and processes with which M interacts, herself, and applies one’s 
own norms of theoretical and practical reasoning to those states and processes. 
As shall be clear from the contributions, Stein’s multi-dimensional account of empa-
thy, Stein can not only accommodate both basic and re-enactive forms of empa-
thy but also, in important ways, expands this typology in a number of interesting 
ways (see Dullstein 2012; Zahavi 2014: 131-141; Shum 2015; Jardine forthcoming 
b). Moreover, as shall be clear from the contributions of Taipale and Jardine, 
Stein’s view that, in directly perceiving other’s mental states in empathy, one not 
only grasps isolated, “mental slices” (Taipale and Jardine, both in this issue), but 
rather always and already grasps certain motivational and rational relations hold-
ing between their mental and emotional states, cuts across Stueber’s distinction. 
Thus, for instance, I not only see that the child is angry, but, at the same time, that 
she is angry because she doesn’t get what she wanted.11 I do not merely apprehend 
                                                
8  Critically, see Jacob 2011. For cogent but different epistemological issues concerning DP 
and the problem of other minds, see Green 2010; Stout 2010; McNeill 2010, 2012. 
9  Husserl, for one, certainly belongs to the more ambivalent phenomenologists concerning 
DP; see Zahavi 2014.  
10  Some have argued that DP equally counts against simulation-theorist, see Krueger 2012; 
Gallagher 2001, 2008. 
11  For a related argument, according to which in empathy one not only perceives animated 
bodies always, but always already certain basic ‘social types,’ see Taipale forthcoming. 
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a proposition or a content but grasp a person’s mental state or emotional and 
their motivation and rationale in their context. 
 Regarding questions (ii) and (iii), there is an ongoing debate whether, or in 
what sense exactly, empathy involves or entails affectivity and, in particular, 
whether it involves or entails some form of affective sharing, or even some self-
other identification, feelings of oneness (what Scheler called Einsfühlung) or merg-
ing (Cialdini et al. 1997; May 2011; Zahavi 2014; Zahavi and Rochat 2015; see 
Hobson and Hobson 2007). According to a currently dominant view, empathy is 
characterized as being “caused by sharing the emotions of another person,” or as 
the “simulation of the feelings of others” (Hein and Singer 2008: 153, 156), and is 
then distinguished from cognitive perspective taking, or mindreading. In a similar 
vein, it has been argued that empathy is essentially an affective state and that it 
requires “interpersonal similarity,” or a certain affective isomorphism between 
empathizer and the target subject’s psychological and mental states (Jacob 2011; 
De Vignemont and Jacob 2012). In contrast, building on phenomenological 
grounds, and especially on Husserl, Scheler, Schütz, Walther, and Stein some have 
questioned this assumption and argued—rightly, in our view—that, in empathy, 
one does not necessarily share any emotions, and that empathy is not affective 
state (Zahavi 2011, 2014), but rather a “basic sensitivity to and understanding of 
others” (Zahavi and Rochat 2015: 1) (though not necessarily a prosocial concern 
for others, or the German Sympathie). Moreover, it has been suggested that empa-
thy might, instead of being identical to, rather be conceptually and psychologically 
required for emotional sharing (Zahavi 2014, 2015a, 2015b). Others have taken a 
middle path, arguing that although empathy is not identical to affective sharing, 
empathy and emotions are, indeed, in various ways, and systematically, related to 
one another (Vendrell Ferran 2015, and forthcoming; Svenaeus forthcoming). 
Whichever side one takes in this debate, Stein’s two books on empathy and on 
community (Stein 1917, 1922), especially if taken together, represent a uniquely 
rich resource to tackle this issue.  
 Stein’s contribution to the philosophy of sociality is more often than not 
considered to be confined to the bounds of inter-personal relations, and, in par-
ticular, to her singularly detailed analysis of empathy in her famous dissertation 
(Stein 1917). However, sociality, for Stein,12 is not exhausted by dyadic, face-to-
face, or interpersonal relations. Rather, social reality encompasses a much more 
complex range of properties and facts, such as collectives, societies, various institutional 
entities (ranging from universities to nation states), and more or less cohesive com-
munities, typically bound together by shared values, traditions, rituals, shared hab-
its, collective memories, or even collective emotions. Accordingly, empathy is not 
the only, indeed not sufficient to fathom all aspects and dimension of sociality—
at least, not ordinary, interpersonal forms of empathy, if there are any others in 
the first place (see Szanto in this issue; Salice and Taipale forthcoming). But Stein 
not only distinguishes between different forms of socialities or being-together—
                                                
12  As, indeed, it is the case for almost all early phenomenologists from Scheler and Husserl 
through Walther, Stavenhagen, Kaufmann, Hildebrand, Otaka, to Gurwitsch or Schütz; see Szan-
to and Moran 2015). 
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as indeed most of her contemporaries, above all Scheler (1926a), Otaka (1932) 
and Gurwitsch (1931/1977), as well as previous generations of social psycholo-
gists and early sociologists such as Le Bon (1895), Tönnies (1935), Vierkandt 
(1928), or the unjustly forgotten Theodor Litt (1919) have—notably between 
“mass” or “crowd” (Masse), “society” (Gesellschaft), and “community” (Gemein-
schaft). In her most thorough analysis of the multiple facets of sociality, Stein has 
also explored a number of further fine-grained distinctions regarding the life of 
communities, such as their integration, or ‘conjoining’ through “sentient” or 
“psychic” causality (psychische Kausalität), laws of motivation, and collective inten-
tionality and volition, intriguing discussions of their various cognitive and affec-
tive dimension, such as their affective and spiritual ‘life-power,’ or their collective 
practices of imagination or their shared values. Also, we find in Stein a uniquely 
rich—even compared to Scheler’s (1926b)—account of the difference between 
the communal conjoining of experiences and emotional contagion (Stein 1922: 
148-159 [175-191]), as well as the topical discussion of ideological propagation of 
ideas and “mass contagion” or “mass suggestion” (Stein 1922: 201-212 [241-261]. 
 Moreover, Stein offers an original account of the notoriously complex rela-
tion holding between individuals and community. In doing so, she provides one 
of the most sustained defenses of the key phenomenological insights about we-
intentionality: according to this, highly integrated communities though have a 
mental, volitional and emotional life of their own that is irreducible to the respec-
tive individuals, such a communal, or supra-individual stream of experiences (ge-
meinschaftlicher/überindividueller Erlebnisstrom) is realized and actualized not in some 
‘super-entity’ or some free-floating group mind above and beyond individual 
minds—the bête noire of anti-collectivists like Searle (1995, 2010)—but precisely 
in the rationally, practically, and phenomenally or emotionally integrated first-
person plural, or we-perspective of those individuals. Put differently, what distin-
guishes Stein’s (and most other of her phenomenological contemporaries’) from 
contemporary social ontologists’ take on these issues is her insistence to take into 
account the cognitive, the intentional, the normative as well as the phenomenolog-
ical integration of individuals when considering communities. Moreover, Stein 
considers these different dimensions of social integration all in relation to one-
another, rather than in isolation as it is typically done in contemporary investiga-
tions, which would more often than not treat, for instance, collective emotions 
separately from collective intentionality or group personhood (see Szanto forth-
coming c). At the same time—even if only in nuce—Stein is well aware of the core 
distinctions which underlie much of the current debate in analytic social ontology, 
such as, for example, the above mentioned distinction between subject, mode, or 
content of collective intentionality, and she has important insights on each of the-
se notion, indeed worth reconsidering (see, esp., the contributions of Burns, 
Caminada, and Szanto in this issue). 
 Ultimately, then, Stein’s work is particularly interesting as it affords us with 
an integrative framework for dealing with the phenomenology of collective inten-
tionality and emotions, as well as that of social cognition, which is, in scope and 
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depth, probably only comparable to that of her teachers and mentors, Husserl 
and Scheler (see Szanto forthcoming a, forthcoming b). 
 Now, given that the last two decades have witnessed a growing philosophical 
interest in Stein, one might wonder whether we really need another collection of 
essays on her work. Yet, notwithstanding some important edited volumes, or 
monographic, general or introductory contributions (Collins 1942; Imhof 1987; 
Baseheart 1997; Sawicki 1997; Borden 2003; Feist and Sweet 2003; Lebech 2004, 
2015; Beckmann-Zöller and Gerl-Falkowitz 2006; MacIntyre 2006; Calcagno 
2007, 2014), given Stein’s eminent position in the philosophy of the early twenti-
eth century, and especially within the early phenomenological movement (Fetz et 
al. 1993), there is a rather considerable research lacuna when it comes to a sys-
tematic exploration of her elaborate social philosophy (see, however, Baseheart 
1992; Beckmann-Zöller and Gerl-Falkowitz 2006, and esp. Calcagno 201413).  
 Specifically, consider also that even the few existing work on Stein’s phe-
nomenology of sociality, in philosophy and adjacent disciplines, such as social 
cognition research or the philosophy of nursing, have, almost exclusively, and all-
too narrowly, focused on her work on empathy in (Gallese 2001; Määtä 2006; 
Stueber 2007; Zahavi 1988, 2008, 2010; Dullstein 2012; Meneses and Larkin 2012; 
Shum 2012; Svenaeus forthcoming). However, not only is there no systematic 
account of Stein’s theory of empathy in relation to her equally sophisticated and 
comprehensive phenomenology of sociality and community as conceived in her 
subsequent Beiträge (1922), let alone to her work On the State (1925). Furthermore, 
there has yet been hardly any systematic attempt to evaluate her works against the 
background of the current debates on collective emotions (von Scheve and 
Salmela 2014), agency and intentionality in social ontology (see, however, 
Caminada 2010), or contemporary trends in social and political philosophy (see 




This special issue consists of six articles, three of which focus, primarily, on the 
notion of empathy, or interpersonal relations, while the other three target collec-
tive intentions, actions and emotions. Among these two sets of issues, and among 
the contributions there are, however, a number of thematic and argumentative 
threads, which are taken up and further developed in the respective articles. Thus, 
for example, three articles deal with Stein’s complex phenomenological account 
of emotions and their relation not only to empathy, emotional recognition 
(Jardine), and collective emotions, but also to normativity, values, and genuinely 
collective emotions (Vendrell Ferran and Szanto). 
 In the opening essay, “Empathy and the melodic unity of the other,” Joona 
Taipale explores the phenomenological conception of empathy, and argues—with 
Stein—against a certain spotlight or “mental slice” view of our empathy. In con-
trast, Taipale stresses the embeddedness of mental states into a temporally and 
                                                
13  For a critical review, see Summa’s book review of this work. 
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dynamically extended stream of experiencing, and, in terms of an analogy to mu-
sical perception, the melodic unity of our empathic grasp of them.  
 In her article “Empathy, Emotional Sharing, and Feelings in Stein’s Early 
Work,” Íngrid Vendrell Ferran addresses the, as we have seen, rather intricate 
question of how exactly empathy and feelings are related, and in what sense we 
might say that empathy, for Stein, targets others as “feeling beings” and/or in-
volves sharing their feelings. In doing so, Vendrell Ferran re-assesses Stein’s theory 
of affectivity, and, in particular, her emotional cognitivism, against the back-
ground of the Stein’s early phenomenological influences and interlocutors, such 
as Pfänder, Scheler, or Geiger, as well as the current debate around the notion of 
affective intentionality (Goldie 2000). 
 Szanto’s paper “Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian 
Account” resumes the debate of affective sharing, and discusses it from a distinc-
tively first-person plural perspective. He argues that Stein’s theory affords us with 
an original alternative, and also yields a more fine-grained account of different 
types of shared and collective emotions than currently available standard ac-
counts. In particular, Szanto suggests a solution to the central epistemological and 
normative questions of affective sharing by outlining a suitably extended, non-
dyadic, or collective form of empathy. 
 The next two papers further develop Stein’s theory of communal experienc-
es, as laid out in her 1922 Beiträge, and contextualize it within the contemporary 
debate on collective intentionality and group agency.  
 Thus, Tim Burn’s article “On Being a ‘We’: Edith Stein’s Contribution to the 
Intentionalism Debate” explores Stein’s stance towards a central claim in con-
temporary social ontology, advanced most prominently by Gilbert (1989), namely 
intentionalism. This is the claim that individuals engaged in proper joint agency 
must he be aware of doing so, and of conceiving themselves as part of the respec-
tive collectivity. In contrast, Burn’s argues that Stein’s account plausibly allows for 
collectives that are not identical to the plural subjects of Gilbert’s intentionalism. 
Rather, there may well be communities constituted by individuals who became 
members without any explicit intention to do something together, or who do not 
intend something in terms of joint commitments and under conditions of com-
mon knowledge members, but are nonetheless communities that can be proper 
subjects of collective intentionality.	  
	   In the following article “The Phenomenological Framework of Stein’s Ac-
count of Communal Mind and its Limit Problems,” Emanuele Caminada investi-
gates, in further detail, the question of a supra-individual subject or ‘bearer’ of 
communal experiences, the tensions between the static and genetic analysis of the 
nature of a communal stream of experiences. He argues, critically, that although 
Stein’s holistic understanding does not sidestep the individual but, rather, stresses 
the responsibility of the individual for the accomplishment of the life of the 
community, Stein’s insistence on the possibility of experience of the community 
which ‘lives’ in the individual is indeed not wholly immune to the exaltations of 
the mass-movements of the Great War, the so-called Kriegsideologie of her time. 
Caminada thus demonstrated that Stein’s social ontology is essentially political 
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and deeply embedded into the context of her opposition to pre-war liberal indi-
vidualism. 
 Finally, and still with a view to eminently political issues, the last contribu-
tion, James Jardine’s paper “Stein and Honneth on Empathy and Emotional 
Recognition,” takes up, once more, the issue of empathy and its relation to emo-
tions. He discusses it within the context of contemporary theories of recognition 
and, in particular, Honneth’s distinction between “elementary” and “emotional 
recognition”. Jardine then argues that we can best make sense of this distinction 
by appealing, with Stein, to a distinctive class of emotions which are characterized 
by their targeting others, in their very and unique personhood, and which are 
grounded in empathy.  
 A comprehensive review essay rounds up the special issue, in which Michaela 
Summa critically engages with a recent monograph by a leading Stein scholar, An-
tonio Calcagno’s book on the social and political philosophy of Stein (Calcagno 






Abramova, E., & Slors, M. (2015). Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case 
for direct perception. Consciousness and Cognition. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.013. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Lombardo M., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (Eds.) (2013). Understanding Other 
Minds. Perspectives from Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Baseheart, M. C. (1989). Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Woman and Women’s Education. 
Hypatia, 4(1), 120–131. 
Baseheart, M. C. (1992). Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Community. The Personalist Forum, 
8(s1), 163–173. 
Baseheart, M. C. (1997). Person in the World: Introduction to the Philosophy of Edith Stein. Dor-
drecht: Kluwer. 
Beckmann-Zöller, R., & Gerl-Falkowitz, H.-B. (Eds.) (2006). Die “unbekannte” Edith Stein: 
Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang 
Bianchin, M. (forthcoming). Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plu-
ral First Persons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, doi: 10.1177/0048393115580267. 
Borden, S. (2003). Edith Stein. London: Continuum. 
Butterfill, S. (2013). Interacting mindreaders. Philosophical Studies, 165(3), 841–863. 
Bratman, M. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. Philosophical Review, 101(2), 327–341. 
Bratman, M. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104(1), 97–113. 
Bratman, M. (2014). Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Bruneau, E. G., Dufour, N., & Saxe, R. (2012). Social cognition in members of conflict 
groups: behavioural and neural responses in Arabs, Israelis and South Americans 
to each other’s misfortunes. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 367(1589), 717–730. 
Calcagno, A. (2007). The philosophy of Edith Stein. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
  
13 
Calcagno, A. (2014). Lived experience from the inside out: Social and political philosophy in Edith 
Stein. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 
Calcagno, A. (Ed.) (2015). Edith Stein: women, social-political philosophy, theology, metaphysics and 
public history: New approaches and applications. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Caminada, E. (2010). Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge? Phenomenology and 
Mind, 1, 189–196. 
Chant, S. R., Hindriks, F., & Preyer, G. (Eds.) (2014). From individual to collective intentionali-
ty: New essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chelstrom, E. (2013). Social phenomenology: Husserl, intersubjectivity, and collective intentionality. 
Lanham et al.: Lexington.  
Cialdini, R. B., Brown, S. L., Lewis, B. P., Luce, C., & Neuberg, S. L. (1997). Reinterpret-
ing the empathy–altruism relationship: When one into one equals oneness. Journal 
of personality and social psychology, 73(3), 481–494. 
Collins, J. (1942). Edith Stein and the advance of phenomenology. Thought, 17(4), 685-
708. 
Coplan, A. (2011). Will the real empathy please stand up? A case for a narrow conceptu-
alization. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(s1), 40–65. 
Coplan, A., & Goldie, P. (2011). Introduction. In A. Coplan, & P. Goldie (Eds.), Empa-
thy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (ix-xlvii). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Coplan, A., & Goldie, P. (Eds.) (2011). Empathy: Philosophical and psychological perspectives. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.) (1995a). Folk psychology: The theory of mind debate. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (Eds.) (1995a). Mental simulation: Evaluations and applications. Ox-
ford: Blackwell. 
Decety, J., & Ickes, W. (2009). The social neuroscience of empathy. Cambridge, MA/London: 
MIT Press. 
Debes, R. (Ed.) (2011). Editor’s Introduction to Special Issue Spindel Supplement: Em-
pathy and Ethics. Special Issue of The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(s1), 1–3. 
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), 485–507. 
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010). Can social interaction constitute 
social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(10), 441–447. 
De Vignemont, F., & Jacob, P. (2012). What is it like to feel another’s pain? Philosophy of 
Science, 79(2), 295–316. 
Dullstein, M. (2013). Direct perception and simulation: Stein’s account of empathy. Re-
view of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(2), 333–350. 
Eilan, N. (2014). The You Turn. Philosophical Explorations, 17(3), 265-278. 
Eisenberg, N., & Strayer, J. (Eds.) (1987). Empathy and its development. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press  
Epstein, B. (2015). The ant trap: Rebuilding the foundations of the social sciences. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Eres, R., & Molenberghs, P. (2013). The influence of group membership on the neural 
correlates involved in empathy. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 176. 
Feist, R., & Sweet, W. (Eds.) (2003). Husserl and Stein. Washington, DC: Council for Re-
search in Values and Philosophy. 
  
14 
Fetz, R. L., Rath, M., & Schulz, P. (Eds.). Studien zur Philosophie Edith Steins: Internationales 
Edith-Stein-Symposion Eichstätt 1991. Freiburg/München: Alber 1993 
(=Phänomenologische Forschungen 26/27). 
Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2009). Enactive intersubjectivity: participatory sense-
making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 465-
486. 
Gallagher, S. (2001). The Practice of mind theory, simulation or primary interaction? 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 83–108. 
Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 17(2), 535–543. 
Gallagher, S. (2008b). Inference or interaction: Social cognition without precursors. Philo-
sophical Explorations, 11(3), 163–174. 
Gallagher, S & Varga, S. (2013). Social constraints on the direct perception of emotions 
and intentions. Topoi, 33(1), 185-199. 
Gallese, V. (2001). The “shared manifold” hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5-7), 33–50. 
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and he simulation theory of mind-
reading. Trends in Cognitive Science, 2(1), 493–501.  
Gallotti, M., & Frith, C. D. (2013). Social cognition in the we-mode. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 17(4), 160–165. 
Gilbert, M. (1989). On social facts. London/New York: Routledge. 
Gilbert, M. (2013). Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press. 
Gold, N. (Ed.) (2005). Teamwork: An interdisciplinary perspective: Multi-disciplinary perspectives. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Gubser, M. (2014). The far reaches. Phenomenology, ethics and social renewal in Central Europe. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Gurwitsch, A. (1931/1977). Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt. Ed. by A. Me-
traux. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. [Engl.: (1979). Human Encounters in the Social 
World. (trans. F. Kersten). Duquesne University Press.] 
Hagengruber, R. (2006). Sozialphilosophie als “strenge Wissenschaft”: Überlegungen zu 
Edith Stein und Edmund Husserl. In R. Beckmann-Zöller, & H.-B. Gerl-
Falkowitz (Eds.). Die „unbekannte“ Edith Stein: Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie. 
(59–72). Frankfurt a.M.: Lang.  
Hein, G., & Singer, T. (2008). I feel how you feel but not always: the empathic brain and 
its modulation. Current opinion in neurobiology, 18(2), 153–158. 
Herschbach, M. (2012). On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanis-
tic alternative to enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11(4), 467–486. 
Hobson, J. A., & Hobson, P. R. (2007). Identification: The missing link between joint 
attention and imitation? Development and Psychopathology, 19(2), 411–431. 
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Honneth, A., (1992) Der Kampf um Anerkennung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. [Engl.: The 
Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (trans. J. Anderson), 
Cambridge. MA/London: MIT Press 1995]. 
Huebner, B. (2014). Macrocognition: A theory of distributed minds and collective intentionality. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 




Hutto, D. & Ratcliffe, M. (Eds.) (2007). Folk psychology re-assessed. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Husserl, E. (1950) [=Hua 1]. Cartesianische Meditationen. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie. 
(Ed. by Stephan Strasser). Den Haag: Nijhoff. [Engl. (1960). Cartesian Meditations. 
An Introduction to Phenomenology (trans. D.Cairns). Den Haag: Nijhoff.] 
Husserl, E. (1952) [=Hua 4]. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philo-
sophie. Buch II: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Ed. by M. Biemel). 
The Hague: Nijhoff. [Engl.: (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution 
(trans. R. Rojcewicz, & A. Schuwer). Dordrecht: Kluwer.] 
Husserl, E. (1973) [=Hua 13]. Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nach-
laß. Erster Teil: 1905–1920 (Ed. by I. Kern). Den Haag: Nijhoff. 
Iacoboni, M. (2009). Imitation, empathy, and mirror neurons. Annual Review of Psychology, 
60, 653–670.  
Ickes, W. (Ed.) (1997). Empathic Accuracy. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Imhof, B. W. (1987). Edith Steins philosophische Entwicklung: Leben und Werk (Erster Band). 
Basel/Boston: Birkhäuser. 
Jacob, P. (2011). The direct-perception model of empathy: a critique. Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology, 2(3), 519–540. 
Jensen, R. T., & Moran, D. (2012). Introduction: Intersubjectivity and empathy. Phenome-
nology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 125–133. 
Jensen, R. T., & Moran, D. (Eds.) (2013). The phenomenology of embodied subjectivity. Dor-
drecht: Springer. 
Kaufmann, F. (1930). Soziale Kollektiva. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 1, 294–308. 
Kaufmann, F. (1944). Methodology of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krueger, J. (2012). Seeing mind in action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 
149-173.Krueger, J., & Overgaard, S. (2012). Seeing subjectivity: Defending a per-
ceptual account of other minds. ProtoSociology, 47, 239–262. 
Lebech, M. (2004). Study Guide to Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Hu-
manities. Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, 40–76. 
Lebech, M. (2015). The Philosophy of Edith Stein: From Phenomenology to Metaphysics. Frankfurt 
a.M.: Lang. 
Le Bon, G. (1895). La Psychologie des Foules. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2013. 
[Engl. (1986): The Crowd. A Study of the Popular Mind. London: Fisher Unwin]. 
León, F. (forthcoming). An Interactionist Approach to Shared Cognition: Some Pro-
spects and Challenges. In T. Szanto, & D. Moran (Eds.), The Phenomenology of Social-
ity. Discovering the ‘We’. London, New York: Routledge. 
León, F., & Zahavi, D. (forthcoming). Phenomenology of experiential sharing: The con-
tribution of Schutz and Walther. In A. Salice, & H. B. Schmid (Eds.), Social Reality: 
The Phenomenological Approach. Dordrecht: Springer. 
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011). Group agency. The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Litt, T. (1919). Individuum und Gemeinschaft. Grundfragen der sozialen Theorie und Ethik. Leip-
zig/Berlin: Teubner. 
Määttä, S. M. (2006). Closeness and distance in the nurse-patient relation: the relevance 
of Edith Stein’s concept of empathy. Nursing Philosophy, 7(1), 3–10. 
MacIntyre, A. (2000). Edith Stein. A philosophical prologue 1913–1922. London: Continuum.  
Maibom, H. L. (Ed.) (2014). Empathy and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Malle, B. F. (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning and Social 
Interaction. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press. 
  
16 
Meneses, R. W., & Larkin, M. (2012). Edith Stein and the contemporary psychological 
study of empathy. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 43(2), 151–184. 
Michael, J. (2014). Towards a consensus about the role of empathy in interpersonal un-
derstanding. Topoi, 33(1), 157–172. 
Michael, J., & Fardo, F. (2014). What (if anything) is shared in pain empathy? A critical 
discussion of De Vignemont and Jacob’s theory of the neural substrate of pain 
empathy. Philosophy of Science, 81(1), 154–160. 
Michael, J., Christensen, W. & Overgaard, S. (2014). Mindreading as social expertise. Syn-
these, 191(5), 817–840. 
Mulligan, K. (2001). Phenomenology: Philosophical aspects. International Encyclopedia of the 
Social and Behavioral Sciences (11363–11369). Oxford: Pergamon.  
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2003). Mindreading. An integrated account of pretence, self-Awareness, 
and understanding other minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Otaka, T. (1932). Grundlegungen der Lehre vom sozialen Verband. Wien: Julius Springer. 
Overgaard, S., & Michael, J. (2015). The Interactive Turn in Social Cognition Research: 
A Critique. Philosophical Psychology, 28(2), 160–183. 
Pacherie, E., & Dokic, J. (2006). From mirror neurons to joint actions. Cognitive Systems 
Research, 7(2), 101–112. 
Pettit, P. (2003). Groups with minds of their own. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing Meta-
physics (pp. 167–193). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Prinz, J. (2011). Is Necessary for Morality? In A. Coplan, & P. Goldie (Eds.), Empathy: 
Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (pp. 211–229). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of 
Mind and Simulation. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Reinach, A. (1913). Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts. Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 1, 685–847. 
Ricoeur, P. (2005). The Course of Recognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Rovane, C. (1998). The Bounds of Agency. An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Rovane, C. (2014). Group agency and individualism. Erkenntnis, 79(9), 1663–1684. 
Rupert, R. D. (2005). Minding one’s cognitive systems: When does a group of minds 
constitute a single cognitive unit? Episteme, 1(3), 177–188.  
Rupert, R. D. (2010). Empirical arguments for group minds: A critical appraisal. Philoso-
phy Compass, 6(9), 630–639, 
Salice, A. (2013). Social ontology as embedded in the tradition of realist phenomenology. 
In M. Schmitz, B. Kobow, & H. B. Schmid (Eds.), The Background of Social Reality 
(pp. 217–231) Springer: Dordrecht. 
Salice, A., & Taipale, J. (forthcoming). Empathizing with groups: A phenomenological 
account of group-directed empathy. Phenomenological Psychology. 
Satne, G., & Roepstorff, A. (Eds.) (2015). Introduction: From interacting agents to en-
gaging persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22 (1/2), 9–23. 
Sawicki, M. (1997). Body, text, and science. The literacy of investigative practices and the phenomeno-
logy of Edith Stein. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Scheler, M. (1926a). Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer 
Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus. Bern: Francke 1980. 
[Engl. (1973): Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt 
Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism (trans. M. S. Frings, &  R. L. Funk). 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.] 
  
17 
Scheler, M. (1926b). Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Bonn: Bouvier 2005. [Engl. (1954): 
The Nature of Sympathy (trans. P. Heath). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.] 
Schmid, H. B. (2000). Subjekt, System, Diskurs: Edmund Husserls Begriff transzendentaler Sub-
jektivität in sozialtheoretischen Bezügen. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Schmid, H. B. (2009). Plural action. Essays in philosophy and social science. Dordrecht: Spring-
er. 
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vo-
geley, K. (2013). Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
36(4), 393–414. 
Schuhmann, K. (1988). Husserls Staatsphilosophie. Freiburg/München: Alber. 
Schuhmann, K. (1993). Edith Stein und Adolf Reinach. In R. L. Fetz, M. Rath, & P. 
Schulz (Eds.), Studien zur Philosophie Edith Steins: Internationales Edith-Stein-Symposion 
Eichsätt 1991 (pp. 53–88). Freiburg/München: Alber 1993 (=Phänomenologische For-
schungen, Vol. 26/27). 
Schütz, A. (1932). Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in die verstehende So-
ziologie. Wien: Springer. [Engl. (1967): The Phenomenology of the Social World (trans. G. 
Walsh, & F. Lehnert). Evanston, Ill. Northwestern University Press.] 
Schütz, A., & Luckmann, T. (2003). Strukturen der Lebenswelt. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsge-
sellschaft. 
Schweikard, D., & Schmid, H. B. (2013). Collective intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-intentionality/ Accessed: 
13 July 2013. 
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. London: Penguin. 
Searle, J. R. (2010). Making the social world. The structure of human civilization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shum, P. (2012). Edith Stein and the problem of empathy. Locating ascription and struc-
tural relation to picture consciousness. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 
43(2), 178-194. 
Silverman, E. L. (2014). Edith Stein and Regina Jonas: Religious visionaries in the time of the 
Death Camps. London/New York: Routledge. 
Singer, T., & Lamm, C. (2009). The social neuroscience of empathy. Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 1156(1), 81–96. 
Staude, J. R. (1967). Max Scheler. 1874–1928. An intellectual portrait. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Stavenhagen, K. (1933). Charismatische Persönlichkeitseinungen. In E. Heller, F. Löw 
(Eds.), Neue Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. Alexander Pfänder zu seinem sechzig-
sten Geburtstag gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern (pp. 36–78). Leipzig: Johann Am-
brosius Barth. 
Stein, E. (1917). Zum Problem der Einfühlung. Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe (=ESGA), Bd. 5. 
Wien/Basel/Köln: Herder 2008. [Engl. (1989): On the problem of empathy (trans. W. 
Stein). Washington, D.C.: ICS Publication.] 
Stein, E. (1922). Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaf-
ten. ESGA, Bd. 6. Wien/Basel/Köln: Herder 2010. [Engl.: Philosophy of psychology 
and the humanities (trans. M. C. Baseheart, & M. Sawicki). Washington, D.C.: ICS 
Publication .] 
Stein, E. (1925). Eine Untersuchung über den Staat. ESGA, Bd. 7 (1925). Wien/Basel/Köln: 
Herder 2006. [Engl.: (2006). An Investigation concerning the State (trans. M. Sawicki). 
Washington, D.C.: ICS Publication.] 
  
18 
Stein, E. (2000). Die Frau. Reflexionen und Fragestellungen. ESGA, Bd. 13. 
Wien/Basel/Köln: Herder 2000. [Engl.: (1987). Essays on woman (trans. F. M. 
Oben). Washington, DC: ICS Publications.] 
Stein, E. (2002) Aus dem Leben einer jüdischen Familie: und weitere autobiographische Beiträge. 
ESGA, Bd. 1. [Engl.: (1986). Life in a jewish family: Her unfinished autobiographical ac-
count (trans. J. Koeppel). Washington, DC: ICS Publications.] 
Stueber, K. (2006). Rediscovering empathy: Agency, folk psychology, and the human sciences. Cam-
bridge, MA/London: MIT Press. 
Stueber, K. (2013). Empathy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/empathy/ Accessed: 15 June 2015. 
Svenaeus, F. (forthcoming). The phenomenology of empathy: A Steinian emotional ac-
count. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi. 10.1007/s11097-014-9411-x.  
Szanto, T. (2014). How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis. Phenome-
nology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 99–120. 
Szanto, T. (forthcoming a). Husserl on collective intentionality. In A. Salice, & H. B. 
Schmid (Eds.), Social Reality: The Phenomenological Approach. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Szanto, T. (forthcoming b). Collectivizing persons and personifying collectives: Reas-
sessing Scheler on group personhood. In T. Szanto, & D. Moran (Eds.), The Phe-
nomenology of Sociality. Discovering the ‘We’. London, New York: Routledge. 
Szanto, T. (forthcoming c). Do group persons have collective emotions—Or should 
they? In S. Rinofner-Kreidl, & H. Wiltsche (Eds.), Analytical and Continental Philoso-
phy: Methods and Perspectives. Berlin, Boston: de Gruyter. 
Szanto, T. (in this issue). Collective Emotions, Normativity and Empathy: A Steinian 
Account. Human Studies.  
Szanto, T., & Moran, D. (Eds.) (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Sociality. Discovering the 
‘We’. London/New York: Routledge. 
Taipale, J. (forthcoming). From Types to Tokens: Empathy and Typification. In T. Szan-
to, & D. Moran (Eds.), The Phenomenology of Sociality. Discovering the ‘We’. Lon-
don/New York: Routledge. 
Taylor, C. (1992). The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Ex-
amining the Politics of Recognition (25–73). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Tomasello, M. (2014). A natural history of human thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
Tönnies, F. (81935). Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie. Darm-
stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1991. 
Tollefsen, D. P. (2015). Groups as agents. Cambridge: Polity. 
Tuomela, R. (2007). The philosophy of sociality. The shared point of view. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Tuomela, R. (2013). Social ontology: Collective intentionality and group agents. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Vierkandt, A. (21928). Gesellschaftslehre. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke. 
von Scheve, C., & Salmela, M. (Eds.) (2014). Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Walther, G. (1923). Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften. Jahrbuch für Philosophie 
und phänomenologische Forschung, 6, 1–158. 
Zahavi, D. (1988). Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Dordrecht: Springer. 
[Engl.: (2001). Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity. A Response to the Linguistic-
Pragmatic Critique. (trans. E. A. Behnke). Athens, OH: Ohio University Press]. 
  
19 
Zahavi, D. (2011). Empathy and direct social perception: a phenomenological proposal. 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(3), 541–558. 
Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Zahavi, D. (2015a). You, me, and we. The sharing of emotional experiences. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 22(1/2), 84–101. 
Zahavi, D. (2015b). Self and other: From pure ego to co-constituted we. Continental Phi-
losophy Review, 48(2), 143–60.  
Zahavi, D., & Rochat, P. (2015). Empathy ≠ sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology 
and developmental psychology. Consciousness and Cognition, doi: 
10.1016/j.concog.2015.05.008. 
